3 allure as that of the Energy Independence advocates in the US, but their vision of the future is neither cost effective nor realistic. There is no evidence to suggest that China's domestic oil reserves will double or triple in the next decade, and thus a significant proportion of its incremental consumption will have to be met by imports. Most Chinese officials agree that the country has no choice but to aggressively venture into the global oil market. In fact, the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that China's oil imports will grow from 1.5 million barrels in 2000 to approximately 10.9 million barrels in 2030, when China will be importing about 77 % of its crude oil with more than half of its imports coming from the Gulf States. 
China's Oil Import Strategy
Recognizing that its domestic demand was increasing rapidly, China began to pursue oil supplies outside its borders. By 1997, it was negotiating billions of dollars in oil investments throughout Asia, Africa, the Middle East and even South America. While the geographic scope of its efforts was broad, the strategies and structures underlying these initiatives were far from homogeneous. Clearly China's oil policies were, and to an extent are, a work in progress. The country is groping its way through the complexities of the international oil marketplace. Even under the best of circumstances, countries (and for that matter international oil companies) are forced to adjust their strategies to the policies and political environments in which they are operating. These differ from one country to the next. There are several factors, though, that are particular to China's past oil initiatives. First, the structure of China's oil industry is unique. The government simultaneously strives to retain control of the industry while encouraging its state oil companies to be aggressively entrepreneurial. Its oil and gas infrastructure is less developed than that of many western countries, and this reality shapes its investments and its policies. Second, China is a new entrant in the global market, and this creates both advantages and disadvantages.
Finally, while China worries about its vulnerability to future oil disruptions, the character of its concern is different than that of its western counterparts.
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An Oil industry in Transition
The first characteristic that strikes one about China's oil decision process is the number of key actors with a voice in that process. While western governments influence their petroleum industry, the companies pursue strategies that are primarily driven by commercial factors. In China the decision structure is more complicated. Prior to the mid 1990s, China's energy policy emphasized self sufficiency. The country's leaders eventually realized that an oil independence scenario was financially and technically unrealistic, and China needed to build the capability to participate in global oil markets. In response, it restructured its pre-existing state oil and gas enterprises into two major companies: the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the Chinese National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec). Both produce, import, trade and process oil. While there are exceptions, CNPC has a stronger presence in the north and the west of China, and Sinopec is more visible in the south and east. 9 Sinopec owns more refining capacity and thus is a major buyer of foreign oil, while CNPC is more likely to enter into exploration and production contracts, both within and outside China. There is a smaller company China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) that, as its name suggests, focuses on offshore investments.
In the 1980's and early 1990's, one could think of Sinopec and CNPC as arms of the state. But in 1998, as China's economic policies became more market-oriented, the companies and associated ministries were reorganized to respond to commercial, more than social, goals.
These changes, however, only went so far. The result is a mixture of decisions, some exclusively driven by commercial opportunity and others evidencing strong government intervention. It is not always clear which of these is operational, since there is little transparency. For example, CNPC could enter into an investment that in hindsight was not profitable. Was the failure a case of the government pushing CNPC to make an investment for non-commercial reasons or was it simply a result of the company underestimating the commercial risks?
Not surprisingly this uncertainty made it difficult for CNPC and Sinopec to raise foreign capital, so in 1999, CNPC, with the assistance of the US investment bank, Goldman and Sachs, established a subsidiary, PetroChina, to pursue profitable investment opportunities. An IPO was 5 held on April 7, 2000 in New York and Hong Kong and the company raised about $3 billion, although CNPC hoped to earn three times that much and was forced to scale the offering back. 10 Maintaining the profitability of the state oil companies is a priority for the PRC since it is critical to China's efforts to meet its long-term energy security goals and supplies a significant percentage of the total revenues realized from the struggling state sector.
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While PetroChina resembles a private, investor-owned oil company, a majority of its shares are still owned by CNPC. China's government may very well leave the management and many of the investment decisions to the professional executives, but clearly it has the legal means to intervene, if it so decides. Further, the boards of all of its oil companies consist of senior government officials, many of whom hope to be promoted to higher government posts.
Their ambition makes its difficult for them to ignore "requests" made by the central government since failure to respond could decrease the probability of future promotions. This is not to suggest that government intervention is not costless. In fact, the costs could be high, since investors will raise the cost of capital in reaction to a perceived increase in political risk.
PetroChina stock sells at a discount because its board is not independent of the government, and when Chinese companies seek significant debt financing in the international market, the cost of this debt is affected by the possibility that strategic targets of opportunity may supersede commercial goals.
In summary, China's oil companies are now an unusual agglomeration of modern entrepreneurial talent striving for earnings growth and ever greater profitability, while at the same time remaining arms of a government, increasingly focused on shaping energy policy to meet national strategic and economic goals.
If the government has the ability to intervene, where is this intervention likely to come from? Here again there are a host of agencies that have both an interest in the issue and jurisdiction to become involved. Recognizing these structural problems, the government established the National Energy
Leading Group (NELG) as a part of the State Council, the highest decision body in China. The group is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes the heads of the twelve relevant ministries and commissions, including Defense. To staff this body, the NELG created the National Energy
Office, which will be responsible for developing policies and programs for NELG consideration and for insuring the Group's decisions are implemented.
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This reorganization will not eliminate all of the inherent tensions in the system. As they become more profit-motivated, China's oil companies will be less willing to sacrifice their bottom-line to achieve political goals. Authority is still fragmented with multiple agencies or commissions with some statutory responsibility for energy, but over time the asymmetry of 7 information between the government and its oil companies will decrease, insuring that China's oil strategies will be more coherent. If the trend towards better governance continues and intensifies, China's oil policies will be significantly more sophisticated and effective five years hence than they are today.
Late to the Party
In the mid 1930s, the fledgling US oil industry and its government confronted a world in which the largest known oil reserves outside North America -Iraq, Southeast Asia, and Iranwere tied up by British and European interests. The probability that those interests would voluntarily accept the US oil companies as an equal partner was slim. Hence the companies looked for potential resources outside the European sphere of influence. Some of these were in neighboring countries, but others were in regions that heretofore had been ignored by the established industry, such as Saudi Arabia. Even though the stated US policy was to achieve oil self-sufficiency, both corporate and government officials understood the long-term strategic value of foreign oil. To compete with the European companies, the US government granted its companies generous tax credits and subsidies to invest in oil production outside the US. These efforts were actively supported by the US Department of State and eventually by the US military.
Fifty-five years later, China faces a similar situation. Over the past five decades, US, Japanese, and European companies have forged relationships with key producing countries. The
Chinese perceive these partnerships as entrenched and believed that it would be difficult for their companies to enjoy equal opportunity in those markets. Chinese companies felt compelled to find alternative sources of oil. Not surprisingly, they faced the same choices that US companies had six decades earlier: 1) neighbors, such as Russia and Kazakhstan; 2) countries where entrenched western energy interests were less prominent, such as Yemen, Oman, and several African nations; and 3) countries in which the government had severed most of its historical ties to European and US interests, such as Sudan and Iran. These three categories were all targets of opportunity for China, some more so than others. These bilateral arrangements have a more pronounced government-to-government flavor than the US and European oil strategies, which have relied on multilateral market approaches.
Exxon Mobil does not offer grain sales as a means to cement an oil concession. It is not altogether clear whether this strategy will prove to be effective. Japan enthusiastically pursued similar initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s, but recently has moved away from this approach to a more market-based strategy.
What concerns westerns governments is not so much the expanded scope of these equity arrangements, as the fact that some of them have been consummated with "rogue states" that are openly hostile to the United States (Iran) or have shown a marked disdain for human rights (Sudan). The concern has two elements, which are slightly contradictory. Governments that fit this description usually do not have workable legal and civil institutions, thus contracts depend on the disposition of a few government leaders. When they are replaced, there is no guarantee that the new leadership will honor the agreements of their predecessors. If a contract rests primarily on the good will of the head of state and not on the principles of law when a nation's leadership changes, the contract is vulnerable to expropriation.
A new leader will calculate whether he or she can extract better conditions or benefits from other governments than he or she can from continuing -or renegotiating -the existing arrangement. If he or she reaches the former conclusion, the incumbent will find it fighting to avoid begin pushed out of the country. At a minimum, the incumbent will be forced to give back some of its contractual benefits for the right to continue to operate. This will only encourage the next government to expropriate or claw back still greater benefits.
Relying on oil deals from rogue states is highly risky and may not be economically sustainable over the long term.
The second objection is more valid. Certainly in a situation in which the international community is refusing to invest in a rogue state, Chinese investments and trade will increase the host government's coffers, giving it the ability to buy more arms. China is seeking greater acceptance in international circles and has recently joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), being seen by the world community as supporting rogue states has a cost. It affects the country's credibility in other forums.
In a world in which Chinese oil companies feel that they have few other options, the benefits of having relatively uncontested access to oil supplies may be worth the short-term political costs, but going forward, these costs will rise as China becomes an even greater player in the international market. In future years, a strategy based on international cooperation may look more attractive than one that relies on special arrangements with a few rogue states. China's role in the UN, its recent conference of African leaders in Shanghai, and its central role in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (a collection of Central Asian countries) is testimony to China's evolving recognition that it has a growing stake in promoting international stability and cooperation. Whether China will become the international stakeholder that the US would like is uncertain, but clearly China aspires to be a stability-oriented stakeholder in the global system. marketplace -a marketplace they believe is controlled by western interests.
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In an excellent paper, Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg argue that (Chinese)
"distrust of energy markets is aggravated by the perception that these markets are dominated by concerned that the unrest in these regions will be exported to its Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous region. 23 It also realizes that the flow of oil from Central Asia, and perhaps in the future from Iran, will traverse thousand of miles of territory, primarily populated by Islamic populations.
Growing unrest will put these pipelines in jeopardy. Thus it is not surprising that after the attack on the World Trade Center, China did not oppose the US invasion of Afghanistan.
Summary
Given its projections of growth in oil consumption, a significant portion of China's future growth will be met by oil from the Middle East and specifically the Gulf States. China is well aware that historically the US has a very strong influence in this region. The US invasion of Iraq has only reinforced China's previous suspicions of American motives and the US's strong interest in retaining control of the region's oil. Aware of the US's relationship with Saudi Arabia and its presence in Iraq, China believes that it is at a disadvantage in its efforts to secure Gulf oil supplies.
Despite the obvious challenges, China believes that over time it can make inroads with several key Middle East countries, especially given the growing interest by key Gulf countries to balance their historical over reliance on the United States -a position that is becoming less tenable, given the lack of improvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict and the US invasion of Iraq. From the perspective of the Gulf States, China has two big advantages: It brings a paucity of political baggage to the negotiation table and has an enormous market for Middle East goods and services. As we will demonstrate below, China is leveraging both of these factors to build relationships in the region.
CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Barring stunning discoveries elsewhere, the Middle East will continue to have the largest oil reserves and the lowest production costs. Sixty-four percent of proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East and 42% are in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. 24 The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) predicts that global oil production will be increasingly concentrated in the region. 25 Gulf oil production, currently at 24 million barrels per day, is predicted to reach 35 million barrels per day by 2020. 26 Much of this growth will be targeted towards Asian markets, which already receive a majority of its imports from the Middle East. If China only needed to import two to three million barrels per day, it might be able to cobble together a portfolio of oil purchases from neighboring countries, such as Russia and A closer look at China's interaction with specific Gulf countries illustrates this strategy -one that the US has been reluctant to mirror, especially after the 9/11 attacks.
Saudi Arabia
In 1999, China's President, Jiang Zemin, visited Saudi Arabia. At the conclusion of the visit, he announced the inauguration of a "strategic partnership" with the Kingdom. This partnership created a cross-investment environment where Saudi Arabia agreed to open up select portions of its upstream market (excluding equity oil) to China, and China agreed to open up its refining and marketing sectors to the Saudis. While this agreement was driven by mutual strategic benefits, it was also catalyzed by the need to resolve a major technical obstacle.
China realized that if it was to be able to meet its projected import levels, it needed to be able to access Saudi crude. However in the last twenty years, much of the oil from newer Saudi reserves (including the offshore fields) is heavier and sourer than those produced from its older reserves. China's oil refining industry has been unable to keep up with growing demand, creating a short-term need to import more oil products. Chinese oil refineries are limited in their capacity to process heavier and sourer crudes. China is building six new refineries, and is committed to making significant investments in this sector over the next five years. 35 From the Saudi perspective, to penetrate China's markets it will need to insure that its crude oil can be refined into useful products. Aramco, the Saudi national oil company, could build refining capacity in Saudi Arabia and import product to China, but China seems determined to build domestic capacity sufficient to meet its demand for oil product. Alternatively, Saudi Arabia can invest in China's refining industry and upgrade the capacity to handle Saudi crude oil. Not only will this
give China priority access to Saudi crude, it also will give Saudi Arabia a direct entry into the downstream sectors in China, one of the fastest growing markets in the world.
In 2001, after several years of negotiations, Aramco signed an agreement with Sinopec for a 25% share in a $3.5 billion dollar expansion of an existing refinery in Fujian province, coupled with a new, large ethylene production facility. The plant is due to be complete by 35 Reuters, November 10, 2005. China had 580,000 barrels per day of new refining capacity under construction.
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. 36 China agreed to allow the partners in this deal to open and manage 600 gas stations throughout the province. In return China received a 30-year, long-term supply contract for 30,000 barrels per day of Saudi crude.
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Aramco is now negotiating to build a second refinery in Qingdao. It would be the largest in China with an initial capacity of 200,000 barrels per day to be expanded to 400,000 at a later date. The facility would be designed to handle Arab Heavy crude oil. The refinery would be operated by Aramco, but Sinopec will have an ownership interest. 38 These two projects together require investment totaling over six billion dollars.
While the benefits to both countries could be significant, Aramco and the Saudi government have expressed concern about China's policy to control the price of refined products -a policy that the Chinese government has supported in order to maintain domestic economic and political stability. When world oil prices increase, Chinese regulators ensure that those increases are not immediately passed on to their consumers. While it is unclear whether the refineries or the retailers have to absorb the cost increases, Aramco is purchasing an interest in both sectors. Hence, it wants the Chinese government to amend its price control regime prior to completing its proposed downstream investments.
To win over Sinopec and prevent opposition to the Qingdao project, the Saudi government granted the company a $300 million concession to explore and produce natural gas in Saudi Arabia. Under this arrangement Sinopec will own 80% of a special purpose company and Aramco will own 20%. This partnership is part of the Saudi government's effort to salvage its Gas Initiative. In many ways it is a symbolic deal, since Sinopec has little experience in natural gas production. to Saudi Arabia occurred in the 1980s before Saudi Arabia had even diplomatically recognized the PRC, and was for a set of now-obsolete medium-range ballistic missiles. 40 Since then, China has joined numerous non-proliferation agreements and has not sold additional arms to the Saudis.
Thus the concern expressed by the Gracia Group seems to be speculative and focused on a worstcase-scenario as opposed to any overt negotiations or even discussions.
In summary, China is in the early stages of building a long-term, sustainable relationship with Saudi Arabia built on mutual economic advantage. Despite its initiatives elsewhere, China recognizes that its reliance on Middle Eastern and, more specifically, on Saudi Arabian oil will grow. At the same time, Saudi Arabia realizes that world oil demand in shifting and that much of the growth over the next ten years will be in Asia, and the largest market will be China. While oil trade is at the core of this emerging partnership, China has been careful to expand the 39 The Gracia Group, "The Sino-Saudi Energy Rapprochement: Implications for US National Security," Prepared for the Office of Net Assessment, January 
Other Middle East Countries
China has also entered into contracts with Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen and Syria. In 2004, the total volume imported from these five countries (minus Syria) was 526,000 barrels per day. 44 More than 62% of the imports were from Oman and another 19% were purchased from China will continue to be produced and marketed by the Yemen government or one of its subsidiaries.
In neither Oman nor Yemen is there any evidence that China is locking up and hoarding significant reserves. Oman and, to a lesser extent, Yemen, export a vast majority of its crude oil to Asia. Thus China perceived these countries as less linked to western interests, and a more secure source of supply.
Iraq sits on huge oil reserves, but as one might expect, its government lacks any semblance of stability. As a result, foreign oil companies are reluctant to invest in Iraq, believing that any contract has limited sustainability. China was active in Iraq in the 1990s, but since the US invasion, its activities have been limited to purchasing a small amount of oil for import.
China recently approved a $5 billion 15 million ton/year refinery joint venture between Sinopec and the Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation (KPC); which, if completed, will be the largest such venture in the petrochemicals sector.
The history of Sino-Kuwaiti ties illustrates that China's lack of political baggage is not a permanent condition and that China has paid substantial economic costs for aggressive political moves. Chinese involvement with Kuwait was set back by more then ten years as a result of
Sudan
When critics accuse China of hoarding equity oil, partnering with rogue states, and ignoring human rights, they point to Sudan. There are multiple examples of each, but from a short-term, strategic and commercial perspective, Sudan provided China with a unique opportunity to obtain a dominant position in one of the few remaining underdeveloped oil regions in the world. While the short-term benefits have been significant, there are signs that China's initiatives may not be sustainable over the long-term, at least in their present form.
As much as 52% of China's equity oil comes from Sudan. 52 While Sudan is clearly of major importance to China, the reverse is also true. China is of critical importance to Sudan, since 65% of its exports go to China. 53 The number of Chinese workers in Sudan has tripled, since the early 1990s and reached 24,000 in 2006. 54 Chinese non-oil investments are significant and include hydro-electric facilities, a new airport for Khartoum, and several textile plants. China also operates the vast bulk of Sudan's oil production and has a 50% stake in the nation's only major refinery in Khartoum.
To understand the factors that induced China to make these commitments, it is helpful to put them in an historical context. Chevron USA began exploring for oil in 1974 in the Muglad Basin. But when civil war broke out for the second time in the mid 1980s, Chevron abandoned over one billion dollars of private investments and sold its interests to a Canadian firm, which formed the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). In 1997, the firm sold a 40%
share to CNPC. The goal of the newly formed company was to develop Sudan's oil fields in the south-central part of the country and build a 1500km pipeline to a coastal port facility at Marsa al-Bashair, near Port Sudan.
Despite the fact that oil was first discovered in the early 1970s, it was not until 1999 that 25 petroleum resources were undeveloped and most of its territory unexplored. It was one of the few areas in the world that geologists felt might still hold large unexploited resources. While proven reserves remain low, some geologists estimate that investment in exploration and development could allow Sudan to produce more than 600,000 barrels per day in the near future.
55
Hence from China's perspective, Sudan had enormous upside potential. Further, US and European companies had left the region, insuring virtually no competition for access to the country's oil resources.
By 1997, Sudan was in desperate financial straits. Its debt was 250% of GDP. Interest payments were $4.5 million per day, and each day the civil war was draining another one million dollars from its treasury. Rural areas were devastated, undermining its agricultural economy.
GDP was in freefall. The only escape from this financial death spiral was to increase oil revenues. Western companies had left, and China was the only country prepared to fill this While a campaign to convert the southern population to Islam was the public issue that split the two sides, oil played a significant role. Sudan's oil reserves are located in the south.
Initially all oil revenues went to the autonomous southern government, but this was during a period in which reserves estimates were quite small. When it became clear that Sudan might be sitting on major supplies, the north reasserted control. It created a new province -Benitiu -that primarily consisted of the existing oil fields. Concerned about security of supply, it decided to locate the country's only refinery near Khartoum over 1000 kilometers away and build a pipeline from the oil fields to the refinery. This allowed the government to control all the oil revenues, which were used to fund the army and various militia groups. China supplied the technical expertise to develop these reserves. It also agreed to finance the development and provided the workers to expand, construct, and operate the oil fields, the pipeline and the refinery. In other words, China agreed to serve as a total turnkey contractor.
Given that oil revenue was essential to the north's ability to fight the war, militia forces from the south targeted the oil facilities. Conversely the government spent considerable resources in defending the infrastructure. China was caught in a difficult position. With thousands of its citizens at risk, it was under pressure to protect its workers and the facilities that they had built. China had three choices, 1) withdraw from Sudan and leave their investments behind, 2) send security personnel to protect their mangers and workers, or 3) provide technical assistance and equipment to the Sudanese army, so it could protect its workers. While the details remain sketchy, it is clear that the Chinese chose some combination of the second and third option. 56 Although there is no hard evidence that Chinese troops were present in Sudan, from the perspective of the rebel forces in the south, the Chinese had clearly sided with the north and the military government in Khartoum. This view was shared by the government of Chad, which was sympathetic to the south and was fighting its own civil war against Islamic rebels supported by the Sudanese government.
After years of bitter fighting, the two sides finally signed a peace treaty in 2005: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Under its terms, the South will begin a six year period of autonomous self-rule, followed by a vote on secession. 57 If the country votes to stay together the oil revenues will be split, as will the jobs in the industry. The South has formed its own oil company, Nilepet, and disputes are already emerging about which side has the rights to grant concessions for future oil exploration. To no one's surprise, the new government in the south has no interest in dealing with the Chinese. Meanwhile the Khartoum government is expressing concern that the concession terms given to CNPC in the late 1990s were overgenerous. In a world of high oil prices, the lost opportunity cost of these agreements is becoming politically uncomfortable to the Khartoum government, which has suggested that renegotiation is the only fair way to proceed. In addition, Khartoum has initiated negotiations with the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation with the intent to sell a portion of its stake in the Greater Nile
Petroleum Operating Company and unofficially agreed to sell two new blocks -one to the Romanian company, Rompetrol, and the other to the Algerian national oil and gas company, Sonatrach. It seems that China's position of exclusivity is rapidly disappearing.
China has been repeatedly criticized for not condemning the conduct of the Khartoum regime. China's response is that it does not get involved in domestic political affairs and that its activities in Sudan are commercial in nature. But this explanation seems hollow to much of the international establishment that points out that Chinese investments were essential to the financial viability of the al-Bashir government and its military operations.
Has China benefited from its experience in Sudan, and is it likely that the benefits will be sustainable into the future? The answer to the first question is not clear. Certainly China's CNPC was able to acquire a significant amount of equity oil which is a scare commodity in today's world, and they were able to gain a large foothold in a country located in one of the last relatively unexplored oil and gas frontiers. However China has invested substantial sums upfront with the expectation that over a longer period of time it will get this money back plus a generous rate of return. 
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or its successors, China may find that the net present value of its returns, which looked so good four years ago, may be far lower than anticipated.
While one cannot foresee the future with certainty, the probability that China's concessions will be sustainable in their present form is quite low. Governments of rogue states often rest on the authority of one man or at best a small cadre of individuals. When a regime falls, the companies and constituents that benefited from their generosity are often distrusted by the new regime. Secondly, an autocratic government, especially one that has waged a bloody civil war, has enemies and those enemies will be decidedly uncooperative with those favored by the previous government. With most of the reserves and potential oil resources located in the south, this takes on an added dimension. If Sudan splits into two countries, the southern regime will gain a greater role in selecting which companies will operate, build and perhaps own the oil facilities. Given the history of China's partiality to the government in the North, it is unlikely that the authorities in the South will look favorably on Chinese companies.
Moreover, even their friends in Khartoum are upset that China is obtaining what they feel are windfall profits, and there is growing talk of renegotiating the existing contracts. Finally, the backlash in neighboring states, is often more intense. Chad is an example. It has significant oil and gas resources, but due to recent events, Chinese companies will not be welcomed in N'Djamena due to Khartoum's support of rebel groups seeking to overthrow Chad's president.
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Dealing with an unstable autocratic government has long-term liabilities that China may have undervalued in its rush to take advantage of what they saw as a unique commercial and strategic opportunity. It is clear that today, China could never negotiate the favorable terms that it received in the late 1990s nor is it evident that China would feel as comfortable harnessing its
African oil strategy to the al Bashir regimes. Officials in Beijing are becoming aware that the more generous the deal, the greater the risk of expropriation. 58 It is likely that Chad will follow the example of many other oil producing countries and provide its state oil company exclusive access to its reserves.
Conclusion
In the first quarter of 2006, China demanded 7.15 million barrels of oil per day, but only produced 3.85 million barrels per day -a differential of 3.3 million barrels that had to be made up by imports. 59 If one assumes very conservative projections, China must double its imports within ten years to meet its growing demand. It will have to do so in a market in which most of the world's oil will be owned by state petroleum companies. Seeking and purchasing equity oil outside China's borders is an option that is fast disappearing. Hence the fear that China will be able to control and hoard large volumes of foreign oil insuring that they are not available to the West, might be an attractive vision for some Chinese officials, but it is not realistic in tomorrow's oil market.
China may prefer equity oil and state-on-state arrangements, but it is more likely that
Chinese oil companies have little choice but to compete to purchase oil in the international market, in the same way Exxon or British Petroleum buys supplies. More specifically, unless major new oil reserves are discovered elsewhere, it will inevitably have to compete to purchase supplies from Middle East producers, specifically Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iraq might also play a significant role sometime in the future, but unless the present state of civil war is resolved quickly, it will not do so for at least a decade.
While the future is fraught with uncertainty, there are several factors that will characterize the Middle East. First, a large proportion of the world's oil supply is located in this region, and as world consumption increases, a greater proportion of the world's oil will originate from it. Finally, the Middle East remains a tinder box of instability and unrest, and thus the threat of disruptions is always in the background, lurking like a specter in a Greek drama. From
China's view this vulnerability is compounded by the fear, whether realistic or not, of US naval interdiction of the sea lanes from the Gulf to the Sea of China.
As China's demand continues to rise, it knows that it cannot eliminate its vulnerability to future disruptions, and thus its only option is to develop strategies that will allow it to reduce the probability of the impacts.
Like other western countries, China is building strategic storage capacity that will allow it to offset some of the oil lost in a disruption. As seen above, it is trying to persuade countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to invest large sums of money in domestic downstream facilities, thereby creating greater interdependence. China has shown a sophisticated understanding of the Gulf countries desire to be seen as strategic trading partners as opposed to simply a supplier of crude oil. A partnership built around a portfolio of needs and interests is likely to forge stronger bonds than one that focuses only on oil. China also realizes that for many Gulf countries, it is becoming politically uncomfortable to be too reliant on the US. Building new partnerships with China and its oil companies will provide Gulf countries with greater political flexibility and less dependence on the US. China recognizes that it is not about to replace the US in this region, rather it is focusing on shifts at the margin. However, as oil and gas exports to Asia, particularly China, become an even greater percentage of total exports, the relationship between the two regions will grow in mutual importance.
China recognizes that it has a large stake in fostering stability in the region and not provoking unrest. The experiences with Sudan have taught it important lessons, and many of its recent actions are characterized more by caution than aggressive opportunism. Pundits point out that although Iran could play a very important role in its long-term energy strategy, China has been careful not to provoke the United States by aggressively pursuing certain oil and gas 31 arrangements. It has also been careful not to endanger its growing connections and relationships on the other side of the Gulf. As it gains more experience, China will become more sophisticated in the diplomatic and strategic intricacies of oil geopolitics.
China's future oil strategy will be influenced by the growing strength of its oil companies. CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC may still not be on a par with the first tier of private multinational oil companies, but they are becoming more expert in participating in the international marketplace, accessing capital markets and competing for supplies in every corner of the globe. At the same time, these companies are new to the market and inevitably they will sometimes miscalculate the financial and strategic risks and rewards to their own detriment.
They are trying to learn the complex ropes of the international marketplace. The Chinese leadership recognizes that a strong and commercially successful industry will be of enormous value to the country's efforts to build both the relationships and the credibility -financial, technical and economic -needed for success in the energy markets of the future. Where strategic and commercial goals are complimentary, the state will continue to aggressively back its companies.
Nurturing its industry and helping its companies increase their asset values and their credibility in the international marketplace will be as valuable a step in enhancing China's oil security as any programmatic initiative. It also plays into China's strength, since its brightest and best energy minds are working in these companies. Further in dealing with the political minefields that characterize the Middle East, there is strategic value in separating the government to government negotiations from the commercial discussions, while retaining the ability and willingness on both sides to complement each other's interest. To some extent this type of dual structure is what has allowed the United States and its oil companies to build successful partnerships in the Gulf over the past half century.
The US and China have a choice: they can enter into an aggressive and hostile, politicized competition for oil supplies. Alternatively, they can cooperate with each other on strategic issues vital to each other's national interests, and agree to compete (and cooperate) commercially in the energy marketplace. Politicizing the search for oil will lead to increased 32 tensions, as each country attempts to capture its fair share of the world's oil. Evidence from the Middle East suggests that in the world of a global energy market, if anyone wins in such great power competition, it is the oil producers themselves. Importers rarely "win" anything of value.
Our study suggests that it is in the United States' interest to facilitate, and if possible accelerate, the commercialization and depoliticization of China's energy policies.
It is difficult to extrapolate from a limited sample of events and projects in one region.
But if China's experiences in the Middle East are representative of the strategies it will adopt in the future, China is already making its selection and will follow the second route, not because it prefers it, but because it may not have any other choice if it is to be able to meet its oil demand over the next two decades.
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